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Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of 
Democratization, and the Fallacy 
of "Ungoverned Spaces"
David Oakley and Pat Proctor
Kansas State University and Command and General Staff School
Introduction
Since the publication of the 2004 National Military Strategy, ungov-
erned spaces and democratization of ill-governed areas have served as the 
linchpins of America's counterterrorism strategy. Many policymakers and 
national security professionals accept as gospel the untested and even 
illogical ungoverned spaces/ill-governed areas concepts.1 To rationalize 
military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Libya, U.S. policymak-
ers have asserted that ungoverned spaces and ill-governed areas serve as 
terrorist safe havens that pose a significant threat to America's interests. 
We contend that these concepts of ungoverned spaces and ill-governed 
Abstract
October 7, 2011, marked a decade since the United States invaded Afghan-
istan and initiated the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While most 
ten-year anniversary gifts involve aluminum, tin, or diamonds, the great-
est gift U.S. policymakers can present American citizens is a reconsidera-
tion of the logic that guides America's counterterrorism strategy. 
Although the United States has successfully averted large-scale domestic 
terrorist attacks, its inability to grasp the nature of the enemy has cost it 
dearly in wasted resources and, more importantly, lost lives. Two of the 
most consistent and glaring policy flaws revolve around the concepts of 
filling "ungoverned spaces" and installing democracy by force.
This article reflects the views and opinions of the authors and does not represent 
the official view of the United States Army or Department of Defense.
Oakley and Proctor: Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the Fallacy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012Journal of Strategic Security
2
areas are dangerous red herrings that do not serve U.S. interests, and the 
continued pursuit of which will only deplete resources, anger foreign pop-
ulations, blemish America's reputation, and make the country less secure.
The purpose of this article is to reflect on the terrorist threat, elements of 
the strategy developed to respond to it, and implementation of the strat-
egy worldwide. Although this article is not intended to serve as an exhaus-
tive history of the past ten years, it will consider some of America's more 
significant actions abroad and their effectiveness. While we're critical of 
the country's counterterrorism policy in general, we believe certain 
aspects of its counterterrorism policy have been effective. The increased 
cooperation among federal and state agencies and local governments has 
been a welcome change. The achievements of America's intelligence com-
munity and special operations forces have been extremely impressive, as 
have the performance and dedication of U.S. service members. Despite 
these accomplishments and the exceptional performance of numerous 
dedicated professionals, we believe the country's strategic approach over-
seas is not only ill-conceived, but incapable of accomplishing its policy 
objectives. The impotence of American counterterrorism strategy is not 
due to the performance of those on the ground called on to implement it; 
rather, it is attributable to policymakers' failure to understand the enemy 
and accept the repercussions of U.S. actions or the limits of the country's 
power. Most policymakers seem unable to understand why other nations 
do not accept "American exceptionalism," or how some of them might 
view U.S. actions as imperialistic. They then choose actions or use rheto-
ric that are not in the country's interests—in fact, are counterproductive to 
its counterterrorism mission.
Who Are We Fighting?
Perhaps the most destructive handicap with which the West has had to 
contend since the beginning of the War on Terrorism is its inability to 
understand whom it needs to fight. Westerners in general and Americans 
in particular do not distinguish between Salafist Wahhabists and Salafist 
jihadist al-Qaida. In her book Living History, then Democratic senator 
and presidential hopeful Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote:
"Wahhabism troubles me because it is a fast-spreading form of 
Islamic fundamentalism that excludes women from full participa-
tion in their societies, promotes religious intolerance and, in its 
most extreme version, as we learned with Usama bin Laden, 
advocates terror and violence."2
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Nor do many prominent Americans distinguish between the political 
Salafist Muslim Brotherhood, the Shia Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (IRGC), and the Salafist jihadist al-Qaida. For instance, former 
Republican senator and presidential hopeful Rick Santorum told a radio 
audience that the Muslim Brotherhood was "as dangerous to Western civ-
ilization and the future of our country" as al-Qaida. He added that, while 
the Brotherhood didn't use violence in Egypt, "that doesn't mean that they 
aren't for all of the things that violent jihadists are for."3
It might surprise Americans to learn that the only people who dislike the 
Muslim Brotherhood more than they do is al-Qaida. Wahhabis differ from 
al-Qaida in two important respects. First, Wahhabism supports the sover-
eignty of the Saudi king, a regime that al-Qaida considers illegitimate. 
Second, theologically, Wahhabists contested Usama bin Laden's authority 
to declare jihad, believing that it is reserved to legitimate sovereigns. 
When Wahhabist clerics condemned al-Qaida's September 11, 2001 
attacks, Usama bin Laden retaliated by denouncing them as corrupt pup-
pets of the illegitimate Saudi king.4 Likewise, al-Qaida condemns the 
Muslim Brotherhood for foregoing jihad and instead turning to civil polit-
ical processes. Then al-Qaida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri 
admonished the Muslim Brothers for "luring thousands of young Muslim 
men into lines for elections...instead of into the line of jihad."5
The Western failure to distinguish Salafist jihadism from its less danger-
ous predecessors has caused the United States to establish an unaccept-
ably high bar for winning the War on Terrorism. Setting aside America's 
misguided insistence on engaging in interstate war to stop international 
terrorism, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the United States and her allies 
have, simply put, picked unnecessary fights. In Iraq, besides the unavoid-
able fights with Ba'athists and al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), coalition forces 
engaged in a long, destructive battle with the Iranian-style Shia political 
Salafist party, the Office of the Martyr Sadr, and its armed wing, Jaysh al-
Mahdi. Our insistence on marginalizing Sadr has increased his stature in 
Iraq and given ammunition to conservative elements inside Iran who use 
U.S. aggression against Shia Iraqis to bolster their own domestic support.
The Taliban's entrenched support in Pashtun Afghanistan, combined with 
the Karzai government's weakness in large swaths of the same region, has 
hindered progress in that country as well. After its initial success in 
Afghanistan, the coalition has spent a decade defending a corrupt secular 
regime against a political Salafist Taliban insurgency. Persistent problems 
with the Afghan justice system, including rampant corruption and a 
shortage of qualified judges, have created a void that the Taliban has filled 
with its own, more efficient, culturally familiar shar'ia justice system. 
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Hamid Karzai added fuel to the persistent charges of Afghan government 
corruption with his own 2009 presidential election campaign; interna-
tional observers concluded that as many as a quarter of the ballots cast 
were fraudulent.6 Meanwhile, our insistence on defeating a political sys-
tem incapable of threatening the West has strained the U.S. relationship 
with nuclear-armed Pakistan to the breaking point.
Unfortunately, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan has been almost as 
effective as the Afghan government at alienating Pashtuns. Civilian casu-
alties caused by night raids and air strikes have been a persistent irritant 
throughout the war, but this problem came to a head in 2011 when, only 
days after protests in Kabul prompted Hamid Karzai to publically demand 
an end to all civilian casualties, NATO forces mistakenly shot Karzai's 
cousin in a night raid.7 It is not hard to see why Pashtuns have begun to 
perceive the war as one in which foreign aggressors are trying to supplant 
indigenous, familiar, politically Salafist Taliban rule with a corrupt and 
ineffective Western-backed regime. Alienating the local population in this 
manner has led to discontent and increased societal elements willing to 
support insurgent forces. And so coalition actions intended to decrease 
safe havens might actually be increasing them, thus contradicting the pol-
icy's intent.
Counterterrorism Strategy: Filling Ungoverned 
Spaces and Spreading Democracy
On December 1, 2009, President Obama reaffirmed the United States' 
counterterrorism strategy during his Afghanistan War speech delivered at 
the United States Military Academy. He defined Afghanistan as a "vital 
national interest" in which the "security of the United States is at stake." 
The president further insisted that ungoverned spaces and instability in 
Afghanistan will result in attacks on the United States and its allies.8 
These assertions are widely accepted and seldom questioned in the 
counterterrorism strategy debate. While individuals in Afghanistan 
undoubtedly played a role in planning September 11, 2001, the attacks 
likely would have occurred without Afghanistan as a base of operations. 
We find it difficult to believe that in the telecommunications age, a 
terrorist organization would require a country like Afghanistan to plan, 
organize, and execute attacks. The strength of a terrorist organization is 
not its location, but its ability to promote its message to a distributed and 
receptive audience. The world is a large place with many suitable 
locations for terrorists to avoid the watchful eye of the United States and 
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its allies. The United States does not have the resources necessary to fill 
the global void, and its attempt to establish democracies in ungoverned 
spaces can be counterproductive.
Beyond mere rhetoric, the concept of ungoverned spaces is a pillar of 
America's strategic documents. It first appeared in the 2004 National 
Military Strategy, which warned of the threat posed by ungoverned 
spaces and spoke of the need to eliminate these areas. Since the publica-
tion of the 2004 National Military Strategy, ungoverned spaces have 
been mentioned in the 2006 National Security Strategy, the 2008 
National Defense Strategy, the 2006 Counterterrorism Strategy, and 
President Obama's most recent counterterrorism strategy.9 Each of these 
documents argues that ungoverned spaces are terrorist sanctuaries serv-
ing as bases of operations to attack American interests. The documents 
further assert that the threat posed by the sanctuaries is so severe that 
America must ensure these areas are properly governed.
In 2006, fear of ungoverned spaces led the United States to support Ethi-
opia when it ousted the Islamic Court Union (ICU) from power in Soma-
lia. While Ethiopia and the United States were successful in ejecting the 
ICU, the action only sank the country into further turmoil and confusion. 
The ICU certainly was not an ideal administration that valued individual 
rights, but it did provide a sense of stability in a country that sorely lacked 
basic governmental structures.10 Now, six years after the United States 
supported ICU's ouster, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former leader of the ICU, is 
president of Somalia as it battles al-Shabaab, an arguably more funda-
mentalist Islamic group with close ties to al-Qaida.11 This same organiza-
tion has served as a recruiting tool for U.S. youth within Somali-American 
communities.12 In 2012, the United States faces a failed state in Somalia: 
piracy threatens local trade routes off its coast; al-Qaida is further 
entrenched there; and disenfranchised Somali-American youth have 
found a violent purpose in life. In the end, the United States' fear of 
ungoverned spaces probably caused what it dreaded most—greater tur-
moil and increased Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. More recently, 
America's support in overthrowing an established government—though, 
granted, a depraved one—in Libya helped create a governance vacuum in 
which a democracy might not blossom.13 This action, along with the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003 and rhetorical support of the Arab Spring, may con-
tradict the United States' determination to rid the world of ungoverned 
spaces since those actions are creating ungoverned spaces.
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Confronting the Myth of Ungoverned Spaces
While U.S. officials worry about ungoverned spaces that allow terrorists 
to operate indiscriminately, in reality terrorist organizations can leverage 
technology to plan, organize, and execute attacks. They do not need a 
home base for these purposes. In his book The Accidental Guerrilla, 
David Kilcullen highlights how terrorist organizations use technology to 
recruit members and spread their message to a global population.14 Marc 
Sageman's book Leaderless Jihad explains how al-Qaida's strength is not 
its operational prowess or control of vast territories, but its ability to 
inspire would-be terrorists and the downtrodden.15 Thus, al-Qaida does 
not need to organize, plan, or execute terrorist attacks, but merely serve 
as a motivator through its numerous media outlets.16 There is a certain 
contradiction in the "disconnectedness" theory posed by Thomas Barnett, 
a prominent and influential author whose writings have persuaded many 
policymakers and national security professionals that ungoverned spaces 
are a threat.17 Other authors and researchers have shown that terrorists 
need a certain level of infrastructure and governance to run a transna-
tional organization effectively.18 Terrorist organizations operating out of 
remote and truly ungoverned areas would have great difficulty communi-
cating with subordinates or anyone else.19
A second pillar of America's counterterrorism strategy is democratization 
of ill-governed areas. The logic here is that democratic governments are 
more responsive to citizens' needs, less belligerent toward their neighbors 
and the international community, and less likely to threaten the United 
States. While such notions have become axioms in America's strategic 
documents, cited by many national security professionals and policymak-
ers, substantial evidence shows they are mere conjecture if not outright 
fantasy. In truth, forced democratization is risky, and a democracy's suc-
cess is not inevitable. Even if successful, a democracy could pose a terror-
ist threat. While we do not argue for repression and would prefer 
democratic governments aligned with the United States, aggressively pur-
suing democracy as part of a counterterrorism strategy is unproven, and 
we believe often ineffective and counterproductive.
Democracy as Counterterrorism Strategy: 
A Flawed Approach
The impact of democracy on political violence, particularly terrorism, is 
an important topic for policy choices and implementation. The belief in 
the power of democracy to solve the terrorist problem influenced past 
U.S. presidential administrations and is now captured within strategy and 
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pursued through policy. The notion is so influential that the September 
2006 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism identified the 
advancement of effective democracies as the country's "long-term 
approach" to eradicating terrorism worldwide. But is the belief in democ-
racies' ability to end terrorism justified, or are policymakers pursuing a 
solution for an insolvable problem? This question is critical to better 
understanding the causes of terrorism and the impact of the actions we 
take in combatting it. It is especially important in considering the use of 
military force to institute democracies as a counterterrorism tool.
Democracy's impact on terrorism is difficult to determine accurately 
through most forms of research. In one sense, democracy provides indi-
viduals the freedom to dissent and, through the election booth, a forum 
for it. The liberties associated with democracy—for example, freedom of 
speech and press and the right to assembly peacefully—also provide indi-
viduals with an outlet for being heard. We might expect that this freedom 
to express and resolve grievances would reduce the number of people who 
resort to terrorism to achieve their objectives; but the nature of democ-
racy and the civil liberties it guarantees enable terrorist organizations to 
move undetected, thus exploiting the very principles thought to make ter-
rorism less likely.
Robert Pape's research on why individuals resort to suicide terrorism 
offers some valuable insight into the logic of America's democratization 
strategy.20 He found that suicide terrorism is often used to force liberal 
democracies to make "significant territorial concessions." Thus, one could 
extrapolate from Pape's findings that terrorism generally will increase 
when liberal democracies occupy ungoverned spaces/ill-governed areas 
in order to establish democracy, since an indigenous population's natural 
reaction will be to protect their home and compel invaders to leave. If this 
is true, a policy seeking to occupy ungoverned/ill-governed spaces could 
increase terrorism rather than eradicate it.
Mansfield and Snyder's research on "anocracies" supports this interpreta-
tion of Pape's findings. It shows that as countries transition from auto-
cratic regimes to democracies (the authors call these transitional 
governments "anocracies"), civil strife often increases because the status 
quo has been disrupted. While introducing democracy and economic 
development may steer one group away from terrorism, a group that has 
lost status through the new order may become disenchanted and seek a 
return to the old one. Because their current conditions are beneath their 
expectations, these individuals believe they are being deprived of their 
rightful place in society.21 As a result, they will turn to whatever tactics 
allow them to push back against the newly established order. Since terror-
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ism is a tactic of the weak, they will usually embrace it to achieve political 
gains or reestablish the status quo. The terrorists often will target the out-
side force—or its interests—that imposed democracy to compel it to with-
draw. In addition, they will attack the new governing body to weaken the 
dominant sect and bring about political change. Sectarian violence in Iraq 
conducted by elements of the former Ba'ath Party and Sunni groups 
shows how disruption of the status quo can lead to terrorist events.
Republicans and Democrats alike understand that democracy often 
imposes an administration that is undesirable from their parochial per-
spective. The 2005 Lebanese and 2006 Palestinian elections show how 
promoting democracy in foreign countries does not always yield desirable 
results. While the United States supported free and open elections in Leb-
anon and Palestine, it had difficulty standing by its principles when many 
citizens supported Iranian-backed terrorist organizations as their parties 
of choice.22 Building democracies is not antithetical to terrorist organiza-
tions; witness democratic elections that empowered notorious terrorist 
groups like Hizbollah and Hamas. It is counterproductive for the United 
States to rhetorically promote democracy, but not accept election results. 
This unwillingness to recognize the population's choice if it is distasteful 
to American interests has led some to accuse the United States of imperi-
alism, and of protecting its own interests against those of the indigenous 
population. It might be reassuring to believe that individuals exercising 
their rights will automatically embrace Western-style democracy and cul-
ture, but it is also dangerous and presumptuous.
The United States spent eight years and an estimated $806 billion to 
bring stability and democracy to the people of Iraq.23 The cost of the Iraq 
war, both in terms of blood and treasure, stands as testimony to the diffi-
culty of introducing democracy in a foreign land whose history, culture, 
and way of life differ greatly from the American experience. While the 
U.S. mission in Iraq is finally over, the long-term prognosis for that coun-
try is still uncertain. If Iraq plunges back into sectarian carnage after the 
United States' departure, the once highly touted strategic victories will be 
recognized, belatedly, for what they were: tactical wins only.
We also question America's contention that democratic principles and 
individual rights are an effective tool in controlling ungoverned spaces. As 
many authors—including those of the Defense Department's own Ungov-
erned Areas Project—have noted, increased individual rights and protec-
tions from government tyranny can actually increase ungoverned spaces 
and the threat of terrorism.24 America's twin goals of increasing democra-
cies and gaining control over ungoverned spaces could therefore be at 
odds with each other. The country's promotion of democracy and individ-
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ual rights and its fear of ungoverned spaces pose a contradiction. As glo-
balization breaks down barriers and provides individuals with avenues of 
expression outside the glaring eyes of government authorities, individuals 
and organizations with malign intentions find it easier to hide in ungov-
erned spaces.25 As the United States counters what it sees as the root 
causes of terrorism (lack of freedom and human dignity) by helping 
increase freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, 
and press, it enhances the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit and 
hide among the masses. Of course, no one advocates stripping individuals 
of their liberties as a tactic. Yet, one must acknowledge that increased 
freedoms in an open society make it more difficult to monitor and control 
citizens' behavior.
Perception Is Reality
Constructivism holds that nations have contrasting perceptions and reali-
ties because of culture, history, and experience.26 These differences affect 
how a country perceives the actions or intentions of other individuals and 
nations. This in turn brings into question the assertion that greater free-
doms throughout the Middle East will reverse the United States' poor rep-
utation among the Arab masses. Other nations perceive U.S. actions 
based on their history and culture, not on what America intends to por-
tray. Americans tend to view their country as a white-hatted cowboy try-
ing to right wrongs and bring justice to the downtrodden. But other 
nations see U.S. history through a different set of lenses, and so have a 
contrary perspective. For example, while the United States views its Cold 
War actions as countering Soviet influence, countries like Iran view them 
much differently.
Americans also have difficulty understanding how a people can embrace 
strict Salafism rather than Western-style democracy. From the U.S. per-
spective, the latticework of rights (based on John Locke's "natural rights" 
to life, liberty, and property) that shield the individual from government 
excesses are infinitely preferable to an ideology that subordinates the 
individual to a body of sometimes brutally enforced absolute laws that 
dictate every facet of one's life.27 But from a constructivist perspective, it's 
not difficult to see how a people with a history of arbitrary rulers, whose 
only authority is their capacity to do violence, might find the absolute rule 
of a divine authority very appealing. In other words, the West faces a 
decidedly uphill battle in compelling Afghan Pashtuns to reject familiar, 
comfortable strict Salafism and embrace what they perceive as an exotic 
foreign alternative.
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Schizophrenic Strategy
Well-known military strategist Bernard Brodie once stated that strategic 
thinking was nothing if not pragmatic, and the important question when 
deciding strategy is whether an idea will work.28 Part of the pragmatism 
involved in developing strategy is identifying the resources required to 
achieve one's objectives and, more importantly, deciding whether the 
objectives are worth the estimated costs. Allocating resources to a particu-
lar strategy is a zero-sum game, which means that allocating resources for 
one option takes available resources away from other options (or further 
increases the national debt). As President Eisenhower said in his farewell 
address, good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually 
finds imbalance and frustration.29 The United States' current financial 
state, its ambitious domestic recovery plans, and its desire to establish 
government-run health care—all while waging two wars—has created 
imbalance and frustration. America should understand competing inter-
ests, prioritize policy options, and conduct a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the appropriate policy. All too often American grand strategy 
tries to accomplish everything while sacrificing nothing. The United 
States embarked on the Global War on Terrorism by dismantling two 
regimes, but failed to grasp how their collapse would empower Iran, the 
other declared enemy in the region.
Before the country's 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban and Ira-
nian governments were at odds. During her November 2007 congres-
sional testimony, Hillary Mann Leverett, then director for Iran and 
Persian Gulf Affairs within the National Security Council, testified that 
Iran largely cooperated with America regarding al-Qaida, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. She also stated, "Iran hoped and anticipated that tactical 
cooperation with the United States would lead to a genuine opening 
between our two countries."30 The American inability or unwillingness to 
prioritize between the counterterrorism mission and countering Iran cre-
ated strategic friction. America ignored an opportunity to leverage U.S. 
and Iranian mutual interests within the region to find common ground 
and bring the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to a successful close. Instead, 
it placed Iran within the "axis of evil," thus alienating a country that had 
mastered the use of proxies to wreak havoc and gain strategic advan-
tage.31 For America to find common ground with Iran after 9/11 would 
not have required the two countries to become full-fledged allies. The sus-
picion and contempt between them runs deep, and mutual interest alone 
may not have alleviated the tension. However, the United States' failure to 
find mutual interest with Iran has resulted in a more painful struggle that 
has cost America both lives and money. The U.S. decision to wage two 
wars, while simultaneously refusing to engage Iran before the resolution 
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of the countries' nuclear disagreement, was a schizophrenic strategy that 
ensured the United States would not achieve its policy objectives.
Conclusion
The United States has spent the past eleven years and over $1.2 trillion on 
the Global War on Terrorism, believing it can shape the world into a dem-
ocratic bastion of bliss and peacefulness through force.32 Although we 
have expended large sums of blood and treasure in this pursuit, we have 
failed to grasp the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reaching our objective. 
America's military forces and their interagency partners have performed 
superbly and done a yeoman's job in pursuit of unclear and often 
unachievable policy objectives. Although these dedicated professionals 
have performed well, we are afraid their achievements are ephemeral and, 
sadly, not worth the financial and personal toll the country has paid. Sim-
ilarly, while U.S. national security institutions have learned from this 
experience, the cost has been too high.
While the United States' GWOT, including its decision to send a sizable 
conventional force into Middle Eastern countries, has been less successful 
than originally hoped for, the country has successfully executed other 
aspects of its strategy. The increased coordination among local, state, and 
federal agencies, increased resourcing of intelligence capabilities, and 
improved ability to protect the homeland (demonstrated by ten years 
without a terrorist attack) is a testament to the hard work and dedication 
of the counterterrorism community. The United States must exploit these 
successes and continue to refine its strategy to ensure continued home-
land security.
It is time for the current administration to review the failures and suc-
cesses of the past ten years and determine where to allocate resources for 
the counterterrorism fight. This assessment must be holistic and consider 
other government priorities in order to determine how to allocate its finite 
resources so the nation is adequately protected. The United States cannot 
hope to defeat Salafist jihadism through warfare. Fortunately, it does not 
have to; all it must do is protect itself from the physical threat of Salafist 
jihadism—that is, from international terrorism. Trying to do more, given 
the limited resources at its disposal, will be worse than futile; it will be 
counterproductive. Informed by the lessons of the past ten years, the 
United States must set aside post-9/11 emotions and update its countert-
errorism strategy by considering the limits of its power and by using a 
more holistic approach to allocating its resources. Clearly more research 
is needed in this area.
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